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When a Promise Is Not a Promise: The
Legal Consequences for Journalists
Who Break Promises of
Confidentiality to Sources
by
KATHRYN M. KASE*
Introduction
It was an offer Minneapolis Star Tribune reporter Lori Sturdevant
could not refuse. Days before Minnesota's statewide elections in 1982, a
prominent Minneapolis Republican told Sturdevant he would give her
damaging information about a statewide candidate if Sturdevant would
promise not to reveal her source.' Sturdevant pledged confidentiality
and, in return, received a manila envelope containing a reporter's bo-
nanza: copies of secret court records showing that the democratic candi-
date for lieutenant governor had been convicted of shoplifting twelve
years earlier.2 When Sturdevant submitted the story to the newspaper,
however, her editors refused to honor her promise of confidentiality. 3
The better story, the editors decided, concerned the well-known Republi-
can who had stooped to leaking information about a democratic candi-
date on the virtual eve of a statewide election.4 The next day, the Star
* Articles Editor, St. Mary's Law Journal, 1989-90; J.D., St. Mary's University School
of Law, May, 1990; B.S., Journalism, University of Kansas, 1982.
1. Cohen v. Cowels Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 252-53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) [herein-
after Cohen III]. Sturdevant's source did not limit his offer of information to her. He also
offered the information, in return for confidentiality, to political reporters for the Associated
Press, St Paul Pioneer Press & Dispatch and WCCO.TV. Id
2. Id. (Confidential information detailed the candidate's shoplifting record.) Like
Sturdevant, the reporters for the Associated Press, St. Paul Pioneer Press, and WCCO-TV
promised to conceal the source's identity in return for his information.
3. Id. at 253. Unbeknownst to Sturdevant and her editors, editors at the St. Paul Pioneer
Press also decided to reveal the source's identity along with the information. Only the Associ-
ated Press and WCCO-TV honored their reporters' promises of confidentiality.
4. Id.; see also Confidentiality Suit Trial Starts Today In Minneapolis Court, Minneapolis
Star Tribune, July 5, 1988, at IB, col. 1 [hereinafter Trial Starts Today]; Cohen Awarded
$700,000 in Newspaper Suit, Minneapolis Star Tribune, July 23, 1988, at IA, col. 5 [hereinafter
Cohen Awarded]. A number of factors contributed to the Star Tribune's decision to expose
Sturdevant's source, including the fact that the shoplifting conviction involved only six dollars
worth of merchandise and that it had been expunged from court records. Additionally, Star
Tribune editors believed it to be significant that Sturdevant's source was working for an adver-
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Tribune revealed not only the candidate's criminal record, but also its
reporter's source of the information: Minneapolis advertising executive
Dan Cohen.5 Cohen was fired the day the story was published and two
months later he sued the newspaper, claiming it had breached an oral
contract by exposing him as Sturdevant's confidential source.6 He also
sued Sturdevant for misrepresenting her authority to grant anonymity to
sources.
7
At trial nearly six years later,' a Minnesota district court agreed
with Cohen that the Star Tribune had breached a contract when it volun-
tarily revealed him as its source of the information regarding the shoplift-
ing conviction.9 The contract arose, the court found, when Sturdevant
promised Cohen confidentiality in exchange for the information.10 The
newspaper argued that the first amendment,11 in addition to giving it the
right to print truthful news, also gave it the right to gather the news as its
editors saw fit.' 2 The newspaper asserted this latter right, notwithstand-
ing the harm inflicted on sources. 13 The court disagreed, asserting that
tising agency with ties to the Republican gubernatorial candidate. Editors for the St. Paul
newspaper later cited similar reasons for deciding to reveal Cohen as the source of the shoplift-
ing information. Id.
5. See Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 252; see also Trial Starts Today, supra note 4. Signifi-
cantly, Sturdevant so disagreed with her editors' decision to identify Cohen that she refused to
place her byline on the story. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 253. Although the reading public
tends not to notice newspaper bylines, the absence of one on a newspaper story usually signals
to other journalists that the reporter disagreed with editing decisions regarding the story. See
T. GOLDSTEIN, THE NEWS AT ANY COST: How JOURNALISTS COMPROMISE THEIR ETHICS
TO SHAPE THE NEWS 196 (1985). Reporters' union contracts with many newspapers, includ-
ing the Star Tribune, include clauses allowing reporters to withhold their bylines at will. See
Trial Starts Today, supra note 4.
6. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 253. Because the St. Paul Pioneer Press had exposed Cohen
as the source of the shoplifting information, the St. Paul newspaper was named as a defendant
in Cohen's lawsuit. See Trial Starts Today, supra note 4.
7. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 258. Cohen also sued Salisbury, the St. Paul Pioneer Press
reporter, for misrepresentation. Id
8. See Trial Opens in Suit by Cohen Against Two Newspapers, Minneapolis Star Tribune,
July 6, 1988, at 3B, col. I [hereinafter Cohen Against Two].
9. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 254; see also Jury Awards $700,000 For Breach Of Confiden-
tiality, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1593, 1593 (1988); Cohen Awarded, supra note 4. The district
court jury also found that the St. Paul Pioneer Press & Dispatch had violated its reporter's
promise of confidentiality to Cohen.
10. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2288, 2291 (Minn. D.C.
1988) (Knoll, J., denying the defendant's motion for a new trial) [hereinafter Cohen II]. See
also Cohen Awarded, supra note 4 (promise of confidentiality a binding contract).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
12. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1460, 1464 (Minn. D.C.
1987) (Knoll, J., denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment) [hereinafter Cohen
I].
13. See Cohen Awarded, supra note 4. The trial court found that Cohen's firing cost him
$50,000. Id. Financial experts for Cohen testified in district court that the plaintiff had a
$36,500 salary when he was fired from the advertising agency. Cohen's Claim that He Quit
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the first amendment's newsgathering privilege does not give journalists
the right to violate criminal or civil laws in the pursuit of a news story. 4
The district court also found Sturdevant guilty of misrepresenting
her authority to keep Cohen's identity secret, when in fact editors could
override that promise of secrecy.'5 On appeal, however, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals reversed the lower court after determining that no mis-
representation occurred, because Sturdevant was unaware of internal
Star Tribune policies enabling editors to override a reporter's grant of
confidentiality. 16
Affirmed on appeal, the finding in Cohen v. Cowels Media Co. of a
contract between Sturdevant and her source has caused a furor in the
journalism community.' 7 Journalists believe Cohen encroaches on ethi-
cal territory and curtails freedom of the press."8 Media commentators
question whether Cohen signifies that a journalist cannot identify sources
who provide information that is false or substantially different from that
Contradicted, Minneapolis Star Tribune, July 16, 1988, at 12B, col. 3. Experts projected that
his salary eventually would have risen to $78,000 had he been able to keep his job. Id.
14. Cohen II, 15 Media L. Rep. at 2290, aff'd in part and rev'd in part in Cohen III, 445
N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). In a written opinion denying the newspaper's motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the district court judge bolstered his decision to
disallow a first amendment defense by citing Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973), a
celebrated newsgathering case involving a tabloid photographer who assaulted the Onassis
family in the pursuit of photographs. In Galella, the court contradicted photographer
Galella's contention that the first amendment gave him virtually unlimited rights to gather the
news. 487 F.2d at 992. In a much-quoted decision, the court held "there is no such scope to
the (flirst [a]mendment right. Crimes and torts committed in news gathering are not pro-
tected." Id.
15. Cohen II, 15 Media L. Rep. at 2290 (jury finds misrepresentation by newspapers).
16. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 258-63. For the same reasons, Salisbury also was acquitted
of misrepresentation. See id.
17. See, e.g., Confidentiality Ruling, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Sept. 16, 1989, at 4 (editorial
warning that decision invades news decision-making); Denniston, A Right to Expose Sources?,
WASH. JOURNALISM REV., Nov. 1988, at 18 (decision could make any editorial decision sub-
ject to court review); Breaking the Code of Confidentiality, TIME, Aug. 1, 1988, at 61 (verdict
will increase debate over whether promise of confidentiality is absolute); Langley & Levine,
Broken Promises, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July/Aug. 1988, at 24 [hereinafter Langley &
Levine] (decision in effect penalizes reporters for publishing accurate information); Media Ex-
perts Call Decision a Minefield of Possible Effects, Minneapolis Star Tribune, July 23, 1988, at
IA, col. 5 (decision considered threat to newsgathering privilege) [hereinafter Minefield].
**Editor's Note: Subsequent to the author's completion of this Note, the Supreme Court of
Minnesota reversed the holding of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, finding that a reporter's
promise to keep a source's identity confidential was not enforceable. Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 202, 203 (Minn. 1990) [hereinafter Cohen IV]. This reversal does not
vitiate the validity of Ms. Kase's Note; by contrast, her conclusion is now more appropriate in
light of the court's disavowal of the source's contract theory of recovery.
18. See Minefield, supra note 17, at IA, col. 5; see also Denniston, supra note 17.
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promised. 19 Finally, newspaper owners perceive the decision as simply
another means by which press foes may "harass" the media in court.20
The legal issues raised, and to be discussed within this Note, are
both broad and narrow. The degree to which the first amendment pro-
tects newsgathering constitutes the broad issue. The narrow issue fo-
cuses upon whether the first amendment or another legal mechanism
should allow a journalist to identify a source to whom confidentiality has
been promised.
I
Confidential Sources
A. "According to a Senior Administration Official": The Growth of Media
Reliance on Confidential Sources
If indeed "[t]here are eight million stories in the naked city," 21 the
average newspaper each day publishes hundreds of them, many of which
rely on information from anonymous sources. 2 It is commonly believed
that media reliance on unnamed sources began with Bob Woodward's
relationship with "Deep Throat" during Watergate,23 yet case law dem-
onstrates that the use of confidential sources dates back to 1848.24 The
modem era of confidential sources appears to have begun with President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who held press conferences on the condition
19. Cf. Knoll, Don't Quote Me, But.... THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1988, at 4 (unaccounta-
ble news sources may lie or distort).
20. See, eg., Confidentiality Ruling, supra note 17 (ruling opens new area of litigation that
will benefit press foes); see also Cunningham, Should Reporters Reveal Sources To Editors?,
THE QUILL, Oct. 1988, at 6 (decision paves way for many victimization claims from sources);
Langely & Levine, supra note 17 (press antagonists would have powerful weapon in breach of
contract claim); Minefield, supra note 17 (finding of contractual obligation would enable plain-
tiffs to circumvent first amendment protections); cf N. HENTOFF, THE FIRST FREEDOM 255-
56 (1980) (libel lawsuits filed to frighten newspapers into censoring themselves). But see Knoll,
supra note 19 (Star Tribune's decision to expose source unconscionable).
21. See The Naked City (ABC television serial, 1958-1963) (opening line: "There are eight
million stories in the naked city, and this is one of them.").
22. See, e.g., D. SHAW, PRESS WATCH 56-57 (1984) (major American newspapers publish
significant number of stories quoting anonymous sources); N. ISAACS, UNTENDED GATES 53
(1986) (scoop mentality has encouraged widespread use of confidential sources); N. HENTOFF,
supra note 20, at 227 (quoting editor who claims that staggering number of stories derive from
confidential sources); St. Dizier, Reporters' Use of Confidential Sources, 1974 and 1984: A
Comparative Study, 6 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 44, 46 (1985) (one-third of Florida reporters quote
unnamed sources once a week in stories).
23. See D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 66.
24. See Exparte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471, 471-72 (C.C.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375) (journalist
refused to reveal source of information regarding secret Senate meetings on Mexico treaty); see
also Note, Qualified Privilege for Journalists, 61 U. DET. L. REV. 463, 468 (1984) (Nugent is
the earliest reported case of a journalist refusing to reveal a source).
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that reporters not quote him directly. 25 Press chroniclers uniformly
agree that, since then, the use of confidential sources has skyrocketed,
boosted primarily by secretive presidents and growing journalistic ac-
ceptance of stories attributed to "senior administration officials."' 26 So
accepted is the use of anonymous sources today among journalists that
the rare decision to ban their use from news stories usually is perceived
by journalists to be a function of political pressure, rather than an effort
to improve the quality of journalism.27
Despite widespread acceptance of unattributed news stories among
journalists, the overuse of confidential sources harms both the reporting
and public perception of the news.28 Spurred by Janet Cooke's revelation
that she fabricated the 8-year-old heroin addict portrayed in her Pulitzer
Prize-winning story, "Jimmy's World," 29 reporters and editors have sug-
gested that the public does not believe in the existence of most anony-
mous sources quoted in news stories a0  Another significant problem,
25. See D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 65 (Roosevelt forbade reporters to quote him di-
rectly). President Harry Truman also invoked Roosevelt's rule. Id.
26. See, e.g., id (use of unnamed sources is prevalent in Washington; presidents are the
worst offenders); N. IsAAcs, supra note 22 (use of unnamed sources a lifestyle in Washington);
Johnston, The Anonymous-Source Syndrome, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 1987, at
58 (New York Times and Washington Post use unnamed sources most frequently). Former Los
Angeles Times reporter David Shaw traces the prevalent use of unnamed sources back to the
Kennedy administration, which frequently leaked stories attributed to anonymous officials. D.
SHAW, supra note 22, at 66. President Lyndon Johnson escalated the use of unnamed sources,
Shaw asserts, because Johnson's sensitivity to criticism forced administration officials to leak
stories to the press in order to make dissenting viewpoints known. Watergate added to the
problem of confidential sources, not only because sources feared the legal consequences of
being identified, but also because journalists were under great pressure to "scoop" the competi-
tion. Id.
27. See Sibbison, AP." The Price Of Purity, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 1987,
at 56-57 (wire service ban on confidential sources perceived as result of political bias); cf D.
SHAW, supra note 26, at 59 (ban on confidential sources could restrict free flow of news).
28. See, e.g., N. ISSACS, supra note 22, at 52 (sources cloaked for effect, not need); T.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 219 (confidentiality enabled Janet Cooke to fabricate story about
child heroin addict); D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 57 (use of anonymous sources misleads pub-
lic); Knoll, supra note 19 (confidentiality rules confusing and misunderstood); Zuckerman,
Breaking A Confidence, TIME, Aug. 3, 1987, at 61 (confidentiality allows sources to manipulate
journalists); Johnston, supra note 26, at 54 (reporters give in to requests for anonymity too
easily); Alter, When Sources Get Immunity: Was North Pampered?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 19,
1987, at 54 (confidentiality can lead to immunity from scrutiny); cf Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 692-93 (1972) (confidentiality should not shield source from consequences of violat-
ing the law).
29. See Reinhold, Washington Post Gives Up Pulitzer, Calling Article On Addict, 8, Fiction,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1981, at Al, col. 4 (writer confessed to making up supposed eyewitness
account of child addict using heroin).
30. See D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 60-61 (unidentified sources believed to be made up);
see also T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 241 (New York Gov. Mario Cuomo believes quotes
from unattributed sources often made up, particularly in state government stories); Johnston,
1990]
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revealed in detail through the Iran-Contra Affair,3 ' concerns the cozy
relationships journalists often develop with trusted sources.32 These rela-
tionships frequently cause journalists to neglect verification of the
source's statements or to overlook important news events in which the
source is implicated. 33 Over-reliance on anonymous sources also dis-
courages aggressive pursuit by journalists of information for attribution,
as reporter Sturdevant demonstrated when she granted anonymity to her
source without first determining Cohen's relation to the story sealed in
the manila envelope. 34 Against this background of varied concerns, jour-
nalists must decide not only whether anonymous sources are needed to
supra note 26, at 54 (Miami Herald executive believes anonymity an invitation for reporter to
exaggerate).
31. See Alter, supra note 28 (scandal involving illegal assistance to Nicaragua via profits
from arm sales to Iran).
32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Zuckerman, supra note 28 (confidentiality allows sources to manipulate jour-
nalists); Alter, supra note 28 (confidentiality pacts kept journalists from scrutinizing Lt. Col.
Oliver North's role in the Iran-Contra affair). The Washington press corps often takes the
most blame, and for good reason, for protecting sources instead of reporting the big stories
implicating those sources. See id As Jonathan Alter reported in Newsweek, many Washing-
ton, D.C. reporters suspected Lt. Col. Oliver North was deeply involved in obtaining illegal aid
for the Nicaraguan Contras. Yet, those reporters failed to aggressively pursue the story be-
cause North was a well-known and oft-used confidential source for capitol journalists. Id.
Hometown journalists also have been known to show more loyalty to a well-liked confi-
dential source than to the important story concerning that source. In San Antonio, Texas, the
news media overlooked Mayor Henry Cisneros' extra-marital affair, which he admitted in con-
fidential conversations with journalists. See Thompson, The Facts vs. the Rumors in the Cis-
neros-Medlar Story, San Antonio Express-News, Oct. 15, 1988, at 3A, col. 1 (mayor told
journalists about affair in confidence); see also San Antonio's Mayor, a Hero of Hispanics, Falls
From Grace Amid Moral Lapse, Media Scrutiny, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1988, at A24, col. 1
(many local editors refused to break story of mayoral affair). Cisneros admitted to members of
the news media that he was having an affair, but he did so on a confidential basis, which
effectively prevented journalists from revealing the story. Thompson, supra; but see Peverson,
V am not Perfect,' NEWSWEEK, Oct. 24, 1988, at 25 (columnist refused to be bound by prom-
ise in revealing story of affair).
34. See Trial Starts Today, supra note 4 (reporters offered confidential information on
statewide candidate); see also D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 67 (quicker to get story from anony-
mous source); Knoll, supra note 19 (reporters are stupid to guarantee confidentiality before
knowing content of information); Johnston, supra note 26, at 58 (pressure to produce stories
quickly contributes to use of anonymous sources).
Additionally, commentators say reporters overuse confidential sources, mistakenly believ-
ing that this use adds prestige to their stories. Id.; see also D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 67
(quoting anonymous sources is more glamorous). Certainly, the prevalence of anonymous
sources has had its impact on the journalist community. David Shaw wrote that when he
interviewed Washington journalists for a book chapter on anonymous sources, several report-
ers agreed that unnamed sources are overused, but requested anonymity in connection with
those comments. Id.
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tell a particular story, but whether use of these sources ultimately aids
both the journalism profession and the public.35
As journalists have increasingly turned to anonymous sources, so
have sources increasingly begun to demand that their identities remain
secret-occasionally even before the interview begins.36 A source's de-
mand for anonymity in return for information is but one way confidenti-
ality can be established. Frequently, reporters will offer anonymity in
return for information," particularly if the source hesitates to comment
or if the reporter believes the story to be politically sensitive.38 Clearly,
anonymity has become a commodity in which both journalists and their
sources traffic.
B. The Usual Story: Journalists Fight Court Orders That Demand
Identification of Secret Sources
Journalists ordinarily disclose the identities of confidential sources
only when ordered to do so as a result of a legal proceeding.39 For exam-
ple, journalists may be ordered to reveal their sources for stories regard-
ing criminal activity.' If the journalist is a party to libel litigation, he or
35. See generally D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 59-60 (reduction in use of anonymous
sources suggested as means of rebuilding public trust).
36. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 672 (1972) (reporter agreed not to identify
individual Black Panthers prior to being let into headquarters); D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 64
(sources routinely request confidentiality); Johnston, supra note 26, at 58 (White House brief-
ings routinely given in confidence); Alter, supra note 28 (Lt. Col. Oliver North's briefings for
reporters usually confidential).
37. See D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 67. Commentators, editors, and other media watchers
complain, however, that some reporters are too willing to grant confidentiality for any story.
See id.; see also Johnston, supra note 26 (journalists known to coach sources into being anony-
mous). Shaw reports that Bill Kovach, the former Washington editor of the New York Times,
once lectured a reporter for saying over the telephone to a source, "I assume that's on back-
ground," meaning that the source would not be identified. D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 67.
Kovach followed up by reminding his Washington bureau staff that confidentiality should not
be volunteered, but granted reluctantly. Id
38. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 693 (reporters frequently offer anonymity to obtain
news of others' illegal conduct); D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 62, 66 (attribution not demanded
in investigative reporting during Watergate because of political tenor of times); Thompson,
supra note 33 (columnist offered confidentiality to mayor to obtain marital affair story); Zuck-
erman, supra note 28 (offering confidentiality sometimes the only way to get news).
39. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668-76 (consolidation of four cases involving news-
men called to testify about identities of confidential sources); Tennessee v. Hendricks, 14 Me-
dia L. Rep. (BNA) 2369, 2372 (Tenn. 1988) (reporters subpoenaed to testify in court about
confidential sources regarding criminal activity of defendant); Tribune Co. v. Huffstetler, 489
So.2d 722, 723 (Fla. 1986) (journalist subpoenaed by state attorney investigating county com-
missioners' alleged ethics violations).
40. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 668-76 (newsmen subpoenaed by grand juries for
reporting about confidential sources involved in criminal activity); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259,
263, 394 A.2d 330, 332 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) (journalist ordered to reveal
confidential source in murder trial of doctor); Hendricks, 14 Media L. Rep. at 2372 (reporters
1990]
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she also may be forced to expose sources.41 Further, journalists may be
ordered to reveal sources in civil proceedings to which journalists are not
parties.42 American journalists generally resist such orders,43 claiming
that if they are forced to reveal the identities of confidential sources,
newsgathering will be impaired because sources, fearful of exposure, will
be reluctant to cooperate. 44 Yet, the possibility of incarceration, fines,
loss of work, and public disdain can make the costs of such resistance
high.45
subpoenaed to testify about confidential sources of information regarding criminal activity of
defendant); Huffstetler, 489 So.2d at 723 (journalist subpoenaed in investigation for informa-
tion on confidential sources).
41. See, e.g., DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 507 F. Supp. 880, 883 (D. Haw. 1981) (newspaper
ordered to disclose sources for stories plaintiff claimed libelous); Downing v. Monitor Publish-
ing Co., 120 N.H. 383, 384, 415 A.2d 683, 685 (1980) (libel plaintiff sought identification of
sources who made allegedly defamatory statements); Rancho La Costa v. Penthouse, 106 Cal.
App. 3d 646, 664-65, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347, 358-59 (1980) (court ordered disclosure of sources for
allegedly defamatory story).
42. See, e.g., Sinnott v. Boston Retirement Bd., 402 Mass. 581, 584, 524 N.E.2d 100, 101
(1988) (reporter ordered to disclose confidential source in civil trial over pension); In re Sub-
poena Duces Tecum to Stearns v. Zulka, 489 N.E.2d 146, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (photogra-
pher subpoenaed to turn over photographs for personal injury lawsuit); Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee, 563 F.2d 433, 435 (10th Cir. 1977) (freelance writer's confidential source sought dur-
ing discovery phase in lawsuit brought against nuclear power plant by employee's estate).
43. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 675-76 (newsman attempted to quash subpoena com-
pelling appearance before grand jury to discuss confidential source); Maine v. Hohler, 543
A.2d 364, 364 (Me. 1988) (reporter refused to testify about confidential source in murder trial);
Huffstetler, 489 So.2d at 723 (journalist moved to quash state attorney's subpoena regarding
disclosure of source of allegations of ethics violations by county commissioners).
In addition to the more recent cases mentioned in the previous paragraph, there are many
earlier cases which involve journalists resisting disclosure of their sources to government tribu-
nals. See, e.g., Ex parte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 299, 48 P. 124, 125 (1897) (newsman refused
to divulge source of allegations of bribery among state senators); Joslyn v. People, 67 Colo.
297, 300, 184 P. 375, 376 (1919) (reporter refused to reveal source of confidential grand jury
information to grand jury); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. 235, 236, 85 A. 1011, 1011-12 (1913)
(newsman refused to tell grand jury the identity of source of graft allegations); Plunkett v.
Hamilton, 136 Ga. 72, 81, 70 S.E. 781, 785 (1911) (reporter resisted order to reveal confiden-
tial source of murder information to police commission).
44. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 679, 682 (compelled disclosure of sources would
cause confidential sources to distrust the media and would hurt reporter's ability to gather
news by silencing the sources); Plunkett, 136 Ga. at 81, 70 S.E. at 785 (forced disclosure of
reporter's sources would ruin reporter's ability to report the news); Farber, 78 N.J. at 265, 394
A.2d at 333 (identifying sources from offering sensitive information); N. HENTOFF, supra note
20, at 229-30 (journalists assert that forced disclosure of sources would undermine ability to
gather news).
45. See, e.g., Storer Communications v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1987) (re-
porter held in custody for failure to disclose source pursuant to court order); Farr v. Pitchess,
522 F.2d 464, 466 (9th Cir. 1975) (reporter jailed for failing to name confidential sources of
information relating to murder case), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1975). Perhaps the most
famous case of a reporter who resisted disclosing his source is that of New York Times reporter
Myron Farber. See Farber, 78 N.J. at 259, 394 A.2d at 332. Farber was held in contempt of
court and sentenced to six months in jail. His employer, the New York Times, also was fined
[Vol. 12:565
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Until recently, the law has been largely indifferent to journalistic
arguments for protecting the identity of confidential sources in legal pro-
ceedings.46 Common law affords journalists no special treatment.47 It
grants them no privilege to avoid testifying about their sources' identi-
ties.4" Not until 1972, in the landmark Branzburg v. Hayes49 decision,
did the United States Supreme Court begin to delimit when journalists
could be compelled to identify confidential sources.50 Branzburg estab-
lished that grand juries may compel journalists to disclose their
sources." The decision, however, did not address whether journalists
might claim a privilege of confidentiality when subpoenaed to testify in
$100,000 as a consequence of Farber's non-cooperation. Farber actually served only 82 days
in jail because the trial at which he refused to testify ended. Id
46. See, e.g, United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Garland v. Torte, 259 F.2d
545, 550 (2d Cir. 1958) (rejecting claim that first amendment shielded journalists from re-
vealing confidential sources), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Grand Jury, 322 F. Supp.
573, 574, 577-78 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (journalists have no privilege not to testify before grand jury
about confidential sources); Exparte Lawrence, 116 Cal. 298, 299, 48 P. 124, 125 (1897) (case
finding no common law right of privilege for newsman who refused to reveal confidential
source).
47. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (no common law privilege for newsman to refuse to
disclose identity of anonymous source).
48. See, e.g., Joslyn, 67 Colo. at 298-300, 184 P. at 375-79 (reporter ordered to reveal
source of confidential grand jury information to grand jury); In re Grunow, 84 N.J.L. at 236-
37, 85 A. at 1011-12 (newsman ordered to tell grand jury the identity of source of graft allega-
tions); Plunkett, 136 Ga. at 81, 70 S.E. at 785 (reporter ordered to reveal confidential source of
murder information to police commission); Lawrence, 116 Cal. at 299, 48 P. at 125 (no privi-
lege protecting journalist from divulging source of allegations of bribery among state senators);
Exparte Nugent, 18 F. Cas. 471, 471-72 (C.C.D.C. 1848) (No. 10,375) (earliest case finding no
common law right for newsman to refuse to disclose source of information regarding Mexico
treaty).
49. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg was comprised of four separate lawsuits, only one of
which concerned a journalist's outright refusal to identify a source to a grand jury. Only
journalist Paul Branzburg appealed a judgment involving his refusal ,to identify a source to a
grand jury investigating drug use. Id. at 667. In the other three cases, journalists Branzburg,
Paul Pappas, and Earl Caldwell had been subpoenaed to testify before grand juries about sto-
ries in which confidential sources had been used. In none of those cases, however, had any of
the journalists refused to identify their sources. Id. at 668-79.
50. Id. at 725-52 (Powell, Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Lower courts
generally have acknowledged that the dissenting opinions in Branzburg set the standards for a
qualified privilege for journalists who refused to disclose the identities of confidential sources.
See, e.g., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
51. 408 U.S. at 702-03. The Court found the government's fundamental interest in solv-
ing crime and administering the law led to the journalist's duty to testify when subpoenaed by
the grand jury. Id. at 700-02. Today, the federal courts recognize a qualified privilege for
journalists under federal common law. See Roach, The Newsman's Confidential Source Privi-
lege in Virginia, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 377, 380-81 (1988). The federal courts first recognized
the privilege in Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1976), which held that the
first amendment interest in assuring the free flow of information required finding a qualified
privilege that would enable journalists not to reveal their sources in federal question cases.
This privilege later was extended to cover criminal cases. See United States v. Cuthbertson,
630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).
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criminal proceedings. 2  Other courts, however, have utilized Justice
Stewart's dissent in Branzburg to craft a balancing test to determine
when a journalist's relationship with a confidential source is subordinate
to a court's search for truth.53 When determining whether the journalist
should be protected by a qualified privilege of confidentiality in criminal
proceedings, a court weighs the following factors: (1) whether the jour-
nalist possesses information relevant to the heart of the claim at issue, (2)
whether the information can otherwise be obtained, and (3) whether a
failure by the court to obtain the information would cause a miscarriage
of justice.54 A similar balancing test is employed by the courts in civil
cases." Thus, a qualified privilege protects journalists from disclosure of
sources in limited fact situations.
Branzburg's failure to establish a testimonial privilege for journalists
caused the news media to briefly lobby for the passage of national and
state shield laws. 6 Analogous to the evidentiary rules which protect at-
torneys from compulsory testimony about confidential client communi-
cations,57 shield laws generally allow journalists to refuse to testify about
the identities of confidential sources.58 Today, twenty-six states have
shield laws that provide varying degrees of protection for journalists.59
Twelve of these shield laws provide an absolute privilege for journalists
52. See Note, supra note 24.
.53. Id.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 1976) (judge must
balance interest in maintaining news-source confidentiality against needs of criminal justice
system in deciding whether source must be disclosed); United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586,
587 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (sixth amendment right to fair trial must be balanced against first amend-
ment when determining whether to extend reporter's privilege); United States v. Orsini, 424 F.
Supp. 229, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 559 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1977) (judge must balance
competing interests of journalist and defendant to determine whether confidential source must
be identified), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (determination to com-
pel testimony must balance journalist's needs against court's need for testimony), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 938 (1974); Baker v. F. & F. Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972) (qualified
privilege applies when interest in free press outweighs interest in compelled testimony), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Winegard v. Oxberger, 258 N.W.2d 847, 852 (Iowa 1977) (articu-
lated three balancing factors of relevancy, alternatives and necessity), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
905 (1977).
56. See T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 157-58. Indeed, the Branzburg Court virtually
invited journalists to strengthen shield laws by noting that the United States Supreme Court is
"powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own way and construing their own
constitutions so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute."
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706.
57. See Roach, supra note 51, at 379 (reporter's shield laws similar to attorney-client
privilege).
58. See id., at 383; see also T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 158; cf G. ROBERTSON & A.
NICOL, MEDIA LAW 123-25 (1984) [hereinafter G. ROBERTSON & A. NICOL].
59. Roach, supra note 51, at 387-88 n.70 (list of journalist's shield statutes in 26 states).
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and thereby enable them to avoid testifying about their sources in any
legal proceeding. 6' Other state shield laws provide only a qualified privi-
lege that enables journalists to protect the identities of their sources un-
less the information sought is proved to be important, relevant, and
unobtainable from other sources.6' Despite vigorous lobbying by a me-
dia industry armed with thirty proposed statutes,62 a national shield law
for journalists never won congressional approval. 61 Congressional inac-
tion has prompted at least one newspaper publisher to suggest that jour-
nalists are better off relying on the courts to define when journalists must
testify about confidential sources." Thus, until Cohen v. Cowels Media
Co.,65 the media's primary concern regarding confidential sources cen-
tered not on defending the "right" to identify those sources, but upon
how to protect their identities, particularly in the face of government-
ordered disclosure.66
C. Today's Scoop: Journalists Seek the Right to Expose Their Confidential
Sources Without Their Sources' Permission
Many journalists today support voluntary exposure of confidential
sources when these sources' identities are in the public interest.67 Yet,
these same journalists argue that forced disclosure of sources' identities
impairs newsgathering by instilling fear in potential sources. 6 Although
Cohen vividly exposes the conflicting concerns of journalists with regard
to confidential sources, the decision does not represent the frequency
with which voluntary sources are revealed.
Prominent first amendment attorney Floyd Abrams has commented
that voluntary exposure of confidential sources by journalists is quite
60. Id.
61. See Goodale & Moodhe, Reporter's Privilege Cases, 2 COMM. L. 7, 37 (1988). Gener-
ally, disclosure is more likely to be ordered in a criminal case than in a civil case. See 2 S.
METCALF, R. BIERSTEDT & E. BILDNER, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PUBLISHERS, BROAD-
CASTERS AND REPORTERS §§ 3.09-3.10 (1989) [hereinafter RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES]. The
New Jersey shield statute, for example, has been eroded by court decisions holding that the
sixth amendment right to a fair trial demands that journalists disclose confidential information
whenever it is relevant to a criminal defendant's defense. See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 268,
394 A.2d 330, 334 (1978).
62. See St. Dizier, supra note 22, at 45.
63. See T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 157-58; see also Roach, supra note 51, at 389.
64. See St. Dizier, supra note 22, at 45.
65. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248, (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (first mentioned supra note 1).
66. See Langley & Levine, supra note 17, at 21; see also St. Dizier, supra note 22, at 48.
67. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 20, at 4 (Cohen's last minute disclosure of shoplift-
ing conviction warranted exposing his identity to the public); see also Zuckerman, supra note
28 (journalists should be able to reveal sources if necessary to hold sources accountable).
68. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 677 (1972); In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 268, 394
A.2d 330, 333 (1978); N. HENTOFF, supra note 20, at 229-30.
1990]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
common, particularly in the context of libel trials.69 Recent journalism
history also suggests that such exposure is commonplace and that it does
not necessarily lead to lawsuits. Examples of source exposure abound
and include: journalist Sidney Zion's exposure of Daniel Ellsberg as the
confidential supplier of the so-called "Pentagon Papers" to the New York
Times;70 Bob Woodward's identification of the late Supreme Court Jus-
tice Potter Stewart as his source for The Brethren;7 and Newsweek's un-
masking of Lt. Col. Oliver North as the media's confidential source
regarding retaliation towards terrorists who hijacked the Achille Lauro
cruise ship.7 2
In the same league as the voluntary exposure of a confidential
source's identity is the disclosure of both the source's identity and her
private information. For example, journalists frequently agree to have
private conversations with sources in order to understand sensitive infor-
mation or to gain the source's confidence.73 Sometimes, however, the
journalist breaks his promise never to publish the information discussed
in these conversations. In 1983, for instance, a Washington Post reporter
divulged that democratic presidential candidate Jesse Jackson had, in a
private conversation with reporters, referred to Jews as "Hymie" and
New York City as "Hymietown."'74 More recently, a newspaper colum-
69. See Langley & Levine, supra note 17, at 21 (trend of revealing sources not widely
known). But see Denniston, supra note 17 (broken promises of source confidentiality not com-
mon in journalism). Abrams asserts that journalists frequently reveal breaking their promises
of confidentiality to sources, but "fib" about it to other members of the media. Langley &
Levine, supra note 17, at 21.
70. See T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 156-57. Significantly, Zion was not working for
the New York Times when he identified Ellsberg as having leaked the Pentagon Papers to the
Times. Id. Thus, it is questionable whether Zion had any duty to Ellsberg not to identify him
as the paper's source. Many New York City journalists, however, believed Zion did have such
a duty. Id.
71. See Playboy Interview: Bob Woodward, PLAYBOY, Feb. 1989, at 62 [hereinafter Play-
boy Interview, Bob Woodward] (Justice Potter Stewart started The Brethren project by agreeing
to be a confidential source. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979)).
72. See Two Leaks, But By Whom?, NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1987, at 16. Newsweek's con-
troversial step in identifying North as a former confidential source drew criticism, not only
from the journalism community, but also from Newsweek staffers. See Zuckerman, supra note
28, at 61 (journalists critical of decision to finger North). However, Newsweek media writer
Jonathan Alter said the magazine was justified in exposing North after the lieutenant colonel
told the congressional committee investigating the Iran-Contra Affair that several members of
Congress had compromised the Nation's security by leaking information about the intercep-
tion of a terrorist implicated in the Achille Lauro hijacking. Id. North, in fact, had himself
leaked the details of the hijacking. Id. While North's duplicity may have justified Newsweek's
decision, Alter did not explain to Time why Newsweek, in exposing North, also exposed a Time
reporter who had relied upon the lieutenant colonel as a confidential source.
73. See T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 188.
74. See id. at 187-88. There are conflicting reports about what the ground rules were
when Jackson made his "Hymietown" comments in the presence of Washington Post reporter
Milton Coleman and other journalists. Id. at 188-90. Coleman maintained that the conversa-
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nist in San Antonio, Texas, revealed that the city's mayor, Henry Cis-
neros, had confessed, in a confidential conversation, to an affair with a
campaign aide." In both the Jackson and Cisneros incidents, the jour-
nalists had implicitly or explicitly promised not to reveal the speaker or
the content of his conversation. 76 Yet, the journalists in both cases justi-
fied their revelations as matters of importance to the public." Obviously,
this rationale, if extended, justifies the exposure of nearly anything a
journalist might agree to keep confidential. It also gives journalists the
sole power to determine when a news story is so important that it com-
pels the disclosure of previously secret conversations. Thus, this defense
of importance to the public is replete with opportunity for journalistic
abuse.
D. Newsroom Responses to the Use and Misuse of Confidential Sources
Codes of ethics are not new to the media industry. For decades, the
Society of Professional Journalists and the American Society of Newspa-
per Editors have maintained ethical codes which define the limits of jour-
nalistic conduct in the pursuit of news.78 Some media outlets have
adopted these codes outright, while others have established their own.79
Most codes have had one thing in common: until 1981, they addressed
the issue of confidential sources in cursory fashion."0 Concern about pos-
sible overuse of confidential sources and the Cohen v. Cowels Media Co. 81
tion was "on background," which to him meant that he could write about Jackson's com-
ments, although not attribute them to him. Jackson, however, asserted that none of the
conversation was eligible for publication. Id at 187-88. In any case, commentator Tim Gold-
stein has written that the disagreement over the context of the conversation merely underlines
the need for journalists and sources to clarify the bases of their conversations. Id. at 190.
75. See Thompson, Cisneros Confesses Deep Love For Medlar, San Antonio Express-News,
Oct. 14, 1988, at Al, col. 1 (column detailing mayor's confidential confession to extramarital
affair).
76. See Peverson, supra note 33 (columnist pledged to keep affair secret).
77. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 33 (city needed straightforward account of mayor's
marital problems); T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 187 (candidate for public office could not
hide behind confidentiality).
78. See T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 166 (referring to American Society of Newspaper
Editors' Ethical Code, in force since 1923, while Society of Professional Journalists' Code dates
from 1973). However, the problem remains that the journalism community has refused to put
teeth into its ethical codes. See THE COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND
RESPONSIBLE PRESS 74-75 (1947).
79. See T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 166-68 (news outlets either use industry codes or
write their own).
80. See id, at 217 (stricter procedures regarding confidential sources urged); Cunning-
ham, supra note 20, at 7-8 (editors cracked down on use of confidential sources in early 1980s).
The pivotal event that forced newspapers to re-examine their policies-or lack thereof-re-
garding confidential sources was Janet Cooke's revelation that she had fabricated the existence
of an 8-year-old heroin addict.
81. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (first mentioned supra note 1).
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decision, however, have led some newspapers and television networks to
establish policies regarding anonymous sources. s
2
The hallmark of most of these new policies is their requirement that
reporters first receive permission from editors to grant confidentiality to a
source.8 3 As a corollary, the reporter must reveal the source's identity to
the editor, who presumably will determine whether the source or his in-
formation is the true story. This system of review has been criticized by
reporters and media commentators alike, not only because these rules
present logistical problems for reporters away from the newsroom, but
also because they strip reporters of autonomy. 4 Editors and publishers
nonetheless argue that if the newspaper is to bear the legal responsibility
for the reporter's stories, then the newspaper should have a measure of
control over the reporting." Furthermore, logic indicates that the wiser
policy is to avoid breach of contract initially by never promising confi-
dentiality to a source whose identity is essential to a story.
Although the problems of confidential sources could be controlled
by newsroom procedures, many newsrooms do not have comprehensive
policies regarding the use of confidential sources or any other journalistic
practice.86 Indeed, the news media is wary of establishing internal codes
of ethics for fear they will be used against journalists in the courtroom. 87
82. See Cunningham, supra note 20, at 6-8 (Cohen lawsuit led Star Tribune to promulgate
anonymous source rules); see also To Our Readers: Guidelines on Anonymous Sources, Minne-
apolis Star Tribune, Aug. 11, 1988, at IA, col. 3, and 16A, col. 1 [hereinafter To Our Readers]
(explaining and reprinting newspaper policy on use of anonymous sources).
83. See To Our Readers, supra note 82, at 16A, col. 1 (editor must be consulted before
reporter can promise confidentiality); see also Zuckerman, supra note 28, at 61 (Pioneer Press
had policy since 1982 requiring editors to approve offers of confidentiality); Langley & Levine,
supra note 17, at 22 (several news outlets require editor to approve offer of confidentiality).
84. See Cunningham, supra note 20, at 8 (rule changes relationship that should be one of
mutual trust). Cunningham, a journalism instructor at New York University, suggests that
removing a reporter's right to extend confidentiality to sources may discourage journalists
from working at certain newspapers. Id. at 7. Cunningham argues that because journalists are
naturally independent, they are likely to object to restrictions that strip them of independence.
Id.
85. See generally, Langley & Levine, supra note 17, at 22 (some libel insurers require
sharing of sources or insurance not supplied); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 212-
218 (1984) (master's vicarious liability encompasses all acts by servant within scope of
employment).
86. See T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 167 (newspapers consider it sufficient to subscribe
to ethical ideals of national newspaper organizations).
87. See id. at 166-67 (editor believes cryptic scraps of ethical rules could sway jury in libel
trial). A possible source of this belief may stem from media lawyers' frequent advice that
journalists throw away old notebooks. See also B. DILL, THE JOURNALIST'S HANDBOOK ON
LIBEL AND PRIVACY 194-95 (1986); B. SANFORD, LIBEL & PRIVACY § 6.4.2.3, at 177 (1985)
which states that:
[Notes are rarely helpful in defending defamation litigation. Indeed, as every re-
porter knows, notes are often unintelligible to all but the note-taker and therefore of
little interest or persuasion to a judge or jury. Moreover, they often omit the start-
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Journalists must understand, however, that the lack of established proce-
dures also could be used against them in court.8" Additionally, estab-
lished guidelines would serve as a preventative measure to control
journalistic abuses before they incite legal proceedings.8 9
II
Proposed Responses to the Legal Issues That Arise
When Journalists Voluntarily Identify a
Source to Whom Confidentiality Has
Been Promised
One criticism of the district court's decision in Cohen v. Cowels Me-
dia Co.9' is that it wrongly transformed an ethical matter into a legal
issue.9' This criticism loses sight of the fact that many ethical issues also
have legal implications. 92 The Society of Professional Journalists' Code of
ling fact or accusation which the reporter could not possibly forget but do contain
some information favorable to the plaintiff, which the reporter chose not to use in the
final version for any number of sound reasons. Regardless, a skillful plaintiff's law-
yer can make devastating use of such evidence [even though the] notes ... do not
serve their supposed purpose of authenticating the truth of a defamatory statement.
Despite such advice, neither Sanford nor Dill cite cases in which reporters' notebooks have
been used against them in court. But see T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5, at 167 (threat that
ethical codes will be used against media in court is exaggerated).
88. See RIGHTS AND LIABILrrIEs, supra note 61, § 1.73 (focus on profession's standards
may discourage finding of negligence); see also Seegmiller v. KSL Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 976
(Utah 1981) (customs and practices of profession germane in determining journalist's negli-
gence); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, comment g (1977) (journalistic customs
and practices relevant when determining if journalist disregarded customs and, therefore, was
negligent).
89. See N. ISAACS, supra note 22, at 27 (press commentators agree that a written code
reduces the frequency of abuses, particularly when the code is enforced). See also Sheran &
Isaacman, Do We Want Responsible Press?, 8 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 140-41 (1982) (me-
dia code of ethics would bolster media responsibility). But see H. SIMONS & J. CALIFANO,
THE MEDIA AND THE LAW 36 (1976). Simons and Califano argue that journalists, not the
courts, are responsible for making the media accountable to the public. But the fact remains
that this argument would not need to be made if the media were perceived as fair. Journalists
also argue that a written code of ethics is no guarantee that ethical and legal abuses will not
occur. Id. at 36-38.
90. Cohen II, 15 MEDIA L. REP. at 2288 (first mentioned supra note 10), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part in Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) [** subsequent to the
author's completion of this Note, the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned the holding that a
contract cause of action existed. Cohen IV, 257 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990)].
91. See Minefield, supra note 17, at 4A, col. 5.
92. Compare New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (press cannot
publish knowing or reckless falsehoods) with SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS' CODE
OF ETHICS § IV(l) (1987) ("Truth is our ultimate goal"); see also Langley & Levine, supra
note 17, at 22 (identifying confidential source has ethical and legal implications).
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Ethics, for example, states that a journalist should not plagiarize.93 No
one, however, would question that the plagiarist news writer should not
only be subject to censure for appropriating the work of another, but also
subject to legal sanctions for plagiarism.94  When unethical behavior
breaches another's rights and causes injury, resort to legal remedies is
appropriate. 95
Journalists also argue that legal rules should not apply when a confi-
dential source is injured through the journalist's disclosure of his identity
because the journalist's decision is a "news judgment." Any decision re-
lating to the subject matter and content of a news publication or program
is considered a news judgment.96 Subjecting news judgments to review
by the courts, journalists say, infringes on the first amendment right to a
free press.97 This logic leads to the conclusion that the decision to
plagiarize is a news judgment inasmuch as it is a decision to print the best
available prose. Yet, case law indicates that a news judgment that re-
sulted in the publication of plagiarized material would not be protected.98
Just as news judgments are not rigid shields protecting journalists,
neither should journalists always be required to conceal the identity of a
confidential source.99 The ethical dimensions of the disclosure decision
indicate, however, that the potential harm to both journalist and source
warrants legal protection of both parties. Below, this Note examines the
extension of confidentiality to sources under the bright light of three legal
models. Also considered are the situations in which these models would
93. See SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS' CODE OF ETHICS § 111(6) (1987) (pla-
giarism proclaimed dishonest and unacceptable).
94. See generally Cotton v. Kambly, 101 Mich. App. 537, 542, 300 N.W.2d 627, 629
(1980) (possibility of sanctions from one's profession for misconduct does not diminish one's
eligibility for legal sanctions for same misconduct).
95. See, e.g., Rokos v. Peck, 182 Cal. App. 3d 604, 613, 227 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1986)
(plagiarism redressable injury when plagiarized work protectible under copyright law).
96. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (news judgment is
"[t]he choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on
the size and content of the paper, and the treatment of public issues and public officials-
whether fair or unfair").
97. See Denniston, supra note 17.
98. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (newsgathering not
protected by first amendment if laws broken by newsgatherer).
99. See Playboy Interview: Bob Woodward, supra note 71 (source and information would
be disclosed if source had lied); see also Langley & Levine, supra note 17, at 22 (evidence of a
source's involvement in the crime reported may justify identifying the source to the public);
Zuckerman, supra note 28 (lying by source sufficient justification to reveal identity). Washing-
ton Post editor Bob Woodward, of Watergate fame, asserts that journalists may also identify
confidential sources after the source has died. See Langley & Levine, supra note 17, at 22
(death a release from confidentiality pledge). Woodward's identification of the late CIA direc-
tor William Casey and the late United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart as confi-
dential sources occurred only after their deaths. See Playboy Interview: Bob Woodward, supra
note 71, at 60, 62 (source identities not disclosed while sources still alive).
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enable a journalist to break the promise of source confidentiality without
penalty.
A. The Contract Model: The Promise of Confidentiality as a Binding
Contract
In Cohen v. Cowels Media Co. (Cohen III), ° the reporter's promise
to keep the source's identity secret was found to provide the offer, accept-
ance and consideration necessary to establish a contract.101 Cohen III
upheld the district court's finding that the reporter's promise need not
have been memorialized in writing, as required by the statute of frauds,
because the reporter-source agreement was fully performed within one
year. 102
1. Breach of Valid Contract Theory Compensates Source
If the journalist's agreement to provide confidentiality in return for
the source's delivery of information is a valid contract, then failure to
provide the anonymity promised to a source in return for his or her infor-
mation would constitute a breach of their mutual agreement. 103 When a
party so completely fails to perform, the other contracting party may
claim damages for total breach if the value of the contract has been sub-
stantially impaired."° Substantial impairment occurs when the injured
party must bear a "material inconvenience or injustice." 10 5 Because the
objective of the source's agreement with the journalist is to protect the
source's identity, the value of the contract to the source may be said to be
substantially impaired when the journalist identifies the source by name.
100. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
101. ** Editor's Note: As mentioned supra note 17, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed
Cohen III. The author's original footnote follows; however, the most recent Cohen case over-
rules this finding. Cohen IV, 457 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1990).
In Cohen II, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2288 (Minn. D.C.), the Minnesota district court
found that a contract existed as a result of the reporter's promise of confidentiality to the
source. 15 Media L. Rep. at 2291, aff'd in part and rev'd in part in Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d
248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). A source's promise to provide information to a journalist would
be considered an offer because it is a promise to perform an act in the future. See J. CALAMARI
& J. PERILLO, The Law of Contracts § 2-5, at 31 (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter CALAMARI &
PERILLO]. THE REPORTER'S PROMISE OF CONFIDENTIALITY WOULD CONSTITUTE THE AC-
CEPTANCE BECAUSE THE REPORTER IS VOLUNTARILY AGREEING TO THE EXCHANGE PRO-
POSED BY THE SOURCE. See id. § 2-11, at 73. The information to be provided by the source
would constitute the consideration because the source would not normally be bound to give the
reporter the information. See id. § 4-1, at 187-88.
102. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d at 259.
103. Cohen II, 15 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2288, 2291 (Minn. D.C. 1988), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part in Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 243(4)[A] (1981).
105. Id. § 243, comment e.
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In such cases, then, the source would be entitled to damages for total
breach. 16
Imposing the law of contracts on the reporter's pledge of confidenti-
ality to the source provides great protection for the source, but not the
reporter, who might not be able to guard against the receipt of false in-
formation."0 7 For this reason, journalists rightly fear that sources might
intentionally relay false information and thereafter attempt to use ano-
nymity as a shield against responsibility. 108 Despite these fears, there are
protections for journalists who fall victim to unscrupulous sources.'°9
2. Theory of Fraudulent Misrepresentation Protects Journalist
The contract theory of fraudulent misrepresentation provides relief
for the journalist who discovers that her confidential source has lied,
either about his information or his motives, by enabling the obligor to
either avoid the transaction or sue in tort. 10 Fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion is held to occur under contract law whenever one party intentionally
makes a false statement or misstates a material fact. 11 ' A fact is material
if it would induce a reasonable person to enter a contract or it is calcu-
lated to persuade an individual to enter a contract. 12 A statement is
106. In addition to breaching the contract, it also would appear that Sturdevant and her
editors also repudiated it. The night before Sturdevant's story was published in the newspaper,
Sturdevant telephoned Cohen and informed him her editors had decided to identify him.
When an obligor tells the obligee that she will not perform as promised, the obligor is repudiat-
ing. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 250(a) (1981). Because Sturdevant told
Cohen that she would not perform as promised and keep his name secret, she had informed
him that she was repudiating their contract. A repudiation that accompanies or follows a
breach entitles the obligee to claim damages for total breach. A claim for total breach enables
the injured party to claim damages for all remaining rights up to performance. Cohen, there-
fore, would have been entitled to claim damages for total breach.
107. For a discussion of the contract theory of the reporter-source relationship, specifically
in reference to the Cohen case, see Note, Promises and the Press: First Amendment Limitations
on News Source Recoveryfor Breach of a Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1153,
1157 n.19 (1989).
108. See Langley & Levine, supra note 17, at 22.
109. See id. at 24.
110. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 101 § 9-13, at 356.
111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981); see also 12 S. WILLIS-
TON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1488, at 332 (3d ed. 1981 and Supp. 1988);
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 101 § 9-13, at 356. Under tort law, the requirements for
misrepresentation are more stringent than under contract law. Compare RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 164, comment a (1981) (misrepresentation must be either fraudulent or
material) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1982) (tortious misrepresentation
must be material and fraudulent).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162(2), 164, comment b (1981). This
rule's focus on the reasonable person has been interpreted as meaning that a person may be
justified in relying on a misrepresentation unless the person knows or should know of facts that
would make it unreasonable for him to rely on the statement. See Goff v. American Say. Ass'n
of Kansas, I Kan. App. 2d 75, 81, 561 P.2d 897, 903 (1977). Even if a misrepresentation is not
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fraudulent when it is intended to induce a party to contract and the
maker knows or has reason to know the statement is not true. 113
When a source provides false information in return for anonymity,
he may be said to be misrepresenting a material fact.114 In addition, the
source may also be said to have acted fraudulently if he intended his
information to induce the journalist to extend confidentiality and the
source knew or should have known his information was untrue." 5
When a journalist enters a contract of confidentiality believing a source's
information to be politically or otherwise sensitive, 11 the journalist has
been defrauded if the source's information later turns out to be false.'"'
The remedy of contractual avoidance therefore would allow the journal-
ist to act as if the contract were never made." 8 The journalist would
then be free to identify the duplicitous source.
3. Public Policy Rationales
Contract law's respect for public policy may also affect the enforce-
ment of a contract that provides anonymity for the source who has inten-
tionally provided false information. Public policy reasons will render a
contract unenforceable when the policy outweighs the law's natural in-
terest in enforcing private agreements.' Courts must consider a
number of issues when determining whether to enforce a contract, in-
cluding: the parties' expectations, forfeiture from non-enforcement of the
contract, the public interest in enforcing the contract, the strength of the
public policy and the possibility of furthering that policy.' 20 Public pol-
icy may be derived from legislation or judicial decree, but a court may
also base it on the need to protect the public welfare. 12  Regardless of
the source of the public policy, a contract will not be enforced if public
policy "clearly outweighs" the need for enforcement of the contract. 122
material, there will be cause for avoidance of the contract if the misrepresentation was made
intentionally.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 162(l)(a)-(c), 164, comment b, illus. 1
(1981).
114. See id. § 162(2) (definition of material fact).
115. See id. § 162(l)(a)-(c).
116. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972) (reporters promise anonymity in
return for information about illegal activities); see also D. SHAW, supra note 22, at 62, 66
(investigative stories and Watergate are two instances where anonymity was allowed by report-
ers due to sensitivity of subject matter).
117. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 101 § 9-13, at 356; see also S. WILLISTON, supra
note 111.
118. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 101 § 9-13, at 356.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981).
120. Id. § 178(2), (3)(a)-(b).
121. See id. §§ 178, comment b, 179(b).
122. Id. § 178, comment b.
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In the case of the anonymous source who does not deal honestly
with the journalist, the necessity for enforcing the contract of anonymity
must be balanced against the public's right to know the truth.123
Although contract enforcement would uphold the bargain between a
journalist and a dishonest source, the journalist then could not fulfill his
obligation to report the truth.124 The dishonest source might argue in
response that the journalist has the option of not using the false informa-
tion at all, which would forestall any need to expose the supplier of the
false information. Of course, if the dishonest source had leaked the same
false information to other news outlets that subsequently released stories,
public policy could well favor the journalist who violated her pledge of
confidentiality in order to more fully inform the public. Public policy
considerations within contract law should protect journalists who with-
draw confidentiality promised to unscrupulous sources. This, then, lends
weight to the Cohen court's decision to treat the reporter-source relation-
ship as contractual.' 25
Despite the inherent protections that contract law provides for jour-
nalists who enter into agreements of confidentiality with sources, some
commentators assert that these agreements should not be enforced con-
tractually because contract law exists largely to further commercial rela-
tionships.1 26  While it is true that commentators have described the
reporter-source relationship in many ways-usually as sacred-"com-
mercial relationship" has not been one of them.127 One theory of con-
tract law does consider contract enforcement as a means of ensuring
economic efficiency, 21 but another theory propounds that the law of
contract implements the Judeo-Christian ethic of keeping promises.'
29
By enforcing the promises of confidentiality that journalists make to
sources, contract law therefore fulfills an historic duty that predates Eng-
123. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public benefitted by uninhib-
ited dissemination of truthful news).
124. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(2), (3) (1981) (balancing test
factors).
125. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
126. See Langley & Levine, supra note 17.
127. Id. Commentators Langley and Levine distinguish news gathering from commercial
enterprise by observing the divergent attitudes the media and commercial enterprises have
toward government intervention. The media discourage government intervention in the gath-
ering and publication of the news, while commercial enterprises seek intervention, particularly
via the court system, in order to resolve disputes. Furthermore, the news media perceives
government intervention as limiting press freedom, whereas commercial enterprises perceive
resort to the court system as aiding profitable commerce. Id.
128. See 1 H. HUNTER, MODERN LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1.03, at 1-6 (1986 & 1989 Supp.)
(some consider contract law to be a market mechanism).
129. See id § 1.02, at 1-4 (contract law enforces moral virtue of keeping promises).
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lish common law.13o In the alternative, the reporter-source relationship
cannot properly be considered non-commercial if the resulting story aids
newspaper sales and increases circulation or advertising. 3 1 In either of
these contexts, contractual enforcement of the reporter's promise is co-
extensive with the smooth functioning of the economic system and with
religion-influenced ethical systems.132
B. The Newsgathering Model: The Exposure of a Confidential Source as a
Right Unprotected by the First Amendment's Newsgathering
Privilege
The first amendment, in addition to guaranteeing the freedom to
print the news, 133 also gives the news media a limited right to gather the
news. The United States Supreme Court recognized this newsgathering
privilege in Branzburg v. Hayes,134 but left unstated the protections
newsgathering is to enjoy. Since Branzburg, journalists have not been
exempted from civil and criminal laws while gathering news. 13  This
limited privilege does not force the government to give journalists a right
of access greater than that of the general public, 136 nor does it enable
journalists to flout the law in the pursuit of news. 137
130. See id. Scholars have begun to extend the moral theory of contract law to include the
theory of consent. Id §§ 1-1 to 1-3. This new theory argues that when parties voluntarily
enter into an agreement, contract law should enforce the agreement as a means of recognizing
each party's right to transfer alienable entitlements. Id. By extension, the theory of consent
would support contractual enforcement of the reporter-source agreement simply because the
journalist and the source are able to voluntarily transfer their rights (e.g., the source's right to
information in return for the journalist's right to protect the source's identity).
131. See Cohen II, 15 Media L. Rep. at 2290, aff'd in part and rev'd in part in Cohen III,
445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
132. See H. HUNTER, supra note 128, §§ 1.02, 1.03, at 1-4.
133. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
134. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
135. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1978) (press responsibility to inform
public does not require government to give the press access to places such as jails); Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 (2d Cir. 1973) (privilege provides no immunity for laws broken
while gathering news); State of New Jersey v. Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 13, 404 A.2d 1121, 1130
(1979) (newsgathering privilege did not prevent police from citing news photographer for dis-
orderly conduct for entering restricted area at accident scene).
136. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980); see KQED, 438
U.S. at 8-9; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 4, 17 (1965) (journalist's right to travel to certain
countries not greater than general public's just because of journalist status).
137. See, e.g., Galella, 487 F.2d at 995 (no right to assault news target while gathering
news); Prahl v. Brosamle, 98 Wis.2d 130, 151, 295 N.W.2d 768, 781 (Wis. App. 1980) (no
constitutional right to trespass in pursuit of the news); Belluomo v. KAKE, 3 Kan. App. 2d
461, 463, 596 P.2d 832, 835-36 (1979) (television station tortiously trespassed in pursuit of
news story); Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 12, 404 A.2d at 1123-24 (news photographer properly cited
for disorderly conduct upon entering restricted area at accident scene); cf I. KAUFMANN, THE
MESSAGE, THE MEDIUM AND THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 19 (1970) (illegal conduct not accept-
able merely because it is the means to expressing an idea).
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Journalists have endeavored to expand the newsgathering privilege
by suing for greater rights of access, usually to government-controlled
property, such as prisons and press galleries.138 When appraising gov-
ernment-imposed limits on the news media's access to news, the courts
consider: (1) whether the state's action in limiting access is related to a
compelling interest; and (2) whether the regulated activity is substan-
tially related to that interest.' 39 Journalists may be tempted to resort to
this balancing test when sources seek to restrict newsgathering by enforc-
ing confidentiality agreements. The test, however, protects journalists
only from government acts that impermissibly limit newsgathering.' 4
Because civil enforcement of a contract cannot properly be considered a
government act, there is no basis for applying the balancing test to an
action filed to enforce the journalist's pledge of confidentiality.
Journalists also have sought to extend the newsgathering privilege to
cover violations of criminal and civil law that may occur when reporters
pursue news stories.' 4 ' The courts, however, have held almost uniformly
that there is no right to trespass or invade privacy while gathering
news,142 nor is there a right to engage in wiretapping, assault, or disor-
derly conduct in order to obtain a story.143 Journalists may also violate
138. See, e.g., Consumer's Union of United States Inc. v. Periodical Correspondents Ass'n,
365 F. Supp. 18, 25-26 (D.C. 1973) (journalists have limited right of access to congressional
press gallery).
139. See, e.g., Allen v. Combined Communications, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2417, 2420
(Colo. D.C. 1981) (balancing test outlined); Consumer's Union of United States Inc., 365 F.
Supp. at 25-26 (balancing test delineated); Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 778 (N.D. Ala.
1973) (balancing test described). Because this test is not as strict as other first amendment
balancing tests, such as the actual malice test applied to public figures in media defamation
cases, commentators believe it offers only moderate protection to journalists seeking to expand
the right of access. See McLean, Recognizing The Reporter's Right To Trespass, 9 COMM. & L.
31, 41 (1987) (balancing test provides just moderate protection).
140. See Consumer's Union of United States Inc., 365 F. Supp. at 25-26 (government regu-
lations limit newsgathering subject to balancing test). The test protects journalists from gov-
ernment acts by combining the freedom the first amendment affords the news media with the
equal protection component of the fifth amendment afforded all citizens whenever government
acts. See id. State regulations affecting newsgathering traditionally are measured against the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection guarantee. See Quad-City Community News Serv.
v. Jebens, 334 F. Supp. 8, 17 (S.D. Iowa 1971) (state government denial of press pass must
meet fourteenth amendment standard of equal protection).
141. See, e.g., Galella, 487 F.2d at 995 (first amendment claimed as shield against liability
for actions while newsgathering).
142. See Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (first amendment does
not protect journalist from suit for invasion of privacy); Le Mistral v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, 61 A.D.2d 491, 493-94, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 816-17 (1978) (laws proscribing trespass
and other offenses do not succumb to first amendment in course of newsgathering).
143. See Boddie v. American Broadcasting Co., 731 F.2d 333, 339 (6th Cir. 1984) (televi-
sion station subject to lawsuit under federal wiretap law when reporters secretly tapped a wo-
man's telephone); see also Galella, 487 F.2d at 995 (right to gather news does not include right
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civil law if they breach a contract. 1" If the journalist's promise of confi-
dentiality to a source in return for information is found to establish a
contractual relationship, 45 then the newsgathering privilege should not
protect the journalist who breaches the contract. Therefore, the news-
gathering privilege does not and should not shield the journalist who fails
to honor the promise of confidentiality.
The failure of the newsgathering privilege to shield journalists from
contractual claims appears harsh, and perhaps even a restraint on press
freedom, but it is also just. Journalists prefer to believe the right to a free
press exists in a vacuum, 46 but the courts proclaim that the first amend-
ment mandates responsibilities as well as rights."' Among these respon-
sibilities is the duty not to publish calculated falsehoods 48 and the duty
to obey the general law of the land while gathering news. 149 If journalists
insist on the right to capriciously renounce promises of confidentiality,
the courts could well view this demand as an abdication of a first amend-
ment responsibility and, therefore, as another justification for a narrow
interpretation of press freedom. As observed in Bavarian Motor Works v.
Manchester: 150
[T]he exercise of the right of free speech and free press demands and
even mandates the observance of the co-equal duty not to abuse such
right, but to utilize it with right reason and dignity. Vain lip service to
'duties' in a vacuous reality wherein 'rights' exist, sovereign and in-
dependent of any balancing moral or social factor creates a semantical
mockery of the very foundation of our laws and legal system.'
5
'
to assault news target); Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 12, 404 A.2d at 1123-24 (photographer subject to
disorderly conduct citation proper upon entering restricted area at accident scene).
144. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972) (newspapers not immune from
general law).
145. See Cohen I1, 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding the Cohen II
court's finding of a contract claim).
146. See Le Mistral, 61 A.D.2d 494,402 N.Y.S.2d at 817 (news media exaggerates threat to
first amendment if cause of action for trespass allowed); see also T. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 5,
at 192 (1985) (New York Times repeatedly exaggerates threat that court decisions pose to the
first amendment).
147. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1967) (first amendment not impaired by
sanctions against the printing of calculated falsehoods); see also Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 13, 404
A.2d at 1127 (press freedom must yield to important government interests); Le Mistral, 61
A.D.2d at 494, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817 (news media must fulfill responsibilities if it is to enjoy
first amendment protections); Bavarian Motor Works Ltd. v. Manchester, 61 Misc. 2d 309,
311, 305 N.Y.S.2d 593, 596 (1969) (co-equal part of free speech is responsibility to not abuse
the right).
148. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 389-90.
149. See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682-83 (first amendment contains no privilege en-
abling news media to violate laws while gathering news).
150. 61 Misc. 2d 309, 305 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1969).
151. Id. at 596.
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C. The British Model: Exposure of the Confidential Source as a Breach of
Confidence, Unless the Exposure Serves the Public Interest
Had Cohen v. Cowels Media Co. 152 been litigated in Great Britain, it
would very likely have been tried as a breach of confidence lawsuit.
Breach of confidence affords the source a civil remedy when journalists
promise confidentiality and subsequently disclose information without
the source's permission. 153  A successful breach of confidence lawsuit
hinges on the plaintiff's showing that the information was confidential,
that the journalist agreed to keep the information confidential, and that
the journalist then broke the agreement by publicizing the informa-
tion.154 Resorting to the breach of confidence remedy seems most appro-
priate when a reporter breaks the promise of confidentiality to a source.
The cause of action, however, was developed initially in business-related
lawsuits that sought to prevent the use of information learned in the
course of a business venture.155 Today, breach of confidence increasingly
is deployed against news outlets that rely on confidential sources for
news stories. 156
One defense developed in response to the breach of confidence
charge is that of the public interest. 5 7 The defense requires the news
outlet to demonstrate that the confidential information is of such impor-
tance to the public that the need for publication outweighs the source's
legitimate interest in keeping his information confidential. 158 British
152. Cohen III, 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
153. See G. ROBERTSON & A. NICOL, supra note 58, at 112; see also Cork v. McVicar, 6 J.
MEDIA L. AND PRAC. 108 (1985) (author breached confidentiality by publishing off-the-record
statements of source).
154. G. ROBERTSON & A. NICOL, supra note 58, at 112 (breach of confidence criteria).
155. See, e.g., Seager v. Copydex Ltd., [1967] 1 W.L.R. 923 (C.A.) (effort to prevent sale of
carpet grips manufactured from confidential information); Saltman Eng'g Co. v. Campbell
Eng'g Co., [1963] 3 All E.R. 413 (lawsuit to prevent manufacture of leather punches from
copyrighted designs).
156. See, e.g., Sun Printers Ltd. v. Westminster Press Ltd., [1982] I.R.L.R. 292 (LEXIS,
ENGIND library, CASES file) (Denning M.R., L.) (printing company lawsuit to prevent newspa-
per from publishing management report about future of company).
157. See Hammond, Copyright, Confidence and the Public Interest Defence: "Mole's Char-
ter" or Necessary Safeguard?, 1 INTELL. PROP. J. 293 (1984-85) (claim of public interest recog-
nized as justification for publishing confidential information); see also Lion Laboratories Ltd.
v. Evans, [1984] 2 All E.R. 417, 435 (C.A.) (Griffiths, L.J.) (newspapers allowed to publish
confidential information when of great importance to public); Grant, In the Public Interest?
The Disclosure of Confidential Information, 6 J. MEDIA L. AND PRAC. 178, 183 (1985) (detail-
ing when breach of confidence restrains and allows publication of confidential information).
158. See Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, 95 (Denning M.R., L.) (information in the
public interest exceeds interest in keeping it confidential); see also Woodward v. Hutchins,
[1977] 2 All E.R. 751, 754 (Denning M.R., L.) (public interest defense enables publication
when necessary to prevent the public from being misled); Initial Servs. v. Putterill, [1968]
1 Q.B. 396. 405 (Denning M.R., L.) (exposure of misconduct in the public interest); G. RoB-
ERTSON & A. NICOL, supra note 58, at 117 (public interest defense determines if just cause for
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courts seem likely to allow publication in the public interest when the
confidential information concerns activities that are "iniquitous," that is,
activities that represent terrible wrongdoing by individuals or organiza-
tions.'59 The public interest defense, therefore, constitutes a recognition
by British courts that journalists may have valid reasons for breaching a
source's confidence. 160
Unlike the common law and other products of the British legal sys-
tem, United States courts have not yet adopted the breach of confidence
theory. Adoption is warranted, however, with the advent of Cohen v.
Cowels Media Co., 16' which journalists predict could be the first of many
such lawsuits. 162 While proving that breach of confidence is virtually the
same as proving breach of contract, 63 the defense of public interest
would give American journalists far greater protection than contract law
by putting the public's welfare at issue in determining the propriety of
disclosure." In contrast, the law of contracts narrowly focuses on the
source's duplicity 65 or on journalism's mission relative to the necessity
for contract enforcement 166 before allowing disclosure of the source's
identity. The public interest defense also is valuable for its theoretical
disclosure); Hammond, supra note 157, at 298 (information of public interest must be impor-
tant to world at large).
159. See Malone v. Commissioner of Police (No. 2), [1979] 2 All E.R. 620, 634 (Megarry,
V-C, S.). In Malone, the court suggested that iniquity formerly referred to information that
disclosed criminal activity, but now the word is considered inclusive of any just cause for
breach of confidence. Id at 635. See also British Steel Corp. v. Granada Television Ltd.,
[1981] 1 All E.R. 417, 434 (Megarry V-C, S.); but see Francome v. Mirror Group Newspapers
Ltd., [1984] 2 All E.R. 408, 414 (Donaldson M.R., L.) (iniquitous criminal activity does not
enable citizens to illegally tap telephones). Much confusion exists in British courts over the
definition of iniquity. See Grant, supra note 157, at 180.
160. See Grant, supra note 157, at 185 (breach of confidence tort proposed). The proposed
law would recognize the public interest defense and allow its application whenever warranted
by the "extent and nature" of the information. Id.
161. Cohen II, 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
162. See Langley & Levine, supra note 17, at 23 (sources inevitably will disagree with jour-
nalists about extent of agreement); see also Minefield, supra note 17, at 4A, col.5 (it is possible
that sources will claim agreement when displeased with reaction to their information).
163. Compare Sun Printers Ltd. v. Westminster Press Ltd., [1982] I.R.L.R. 292 (LExIS,
ENGIND library, CASES file) (Denning M.R., L.) (breach of confidence found when journalist
breaks promise to keep information confidential) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 235(2) (1981) (breach of contract reached when promisor fails to perform as
promised).
164. See Hubbard v. Vosper, [1972] 2 Q.B. 84, 95 (Denning M.R., L.); see also G. ROBERT-
SON & A. NICOL, supra note 58, at 117; Hammond, supra note 157, at 298.
165. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 101 § 9-13, at 356 (contracting party may
avoid contract when fraudulently induced to contract).
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981) (contract unenforce-
able when rationale for enforcement outweighed by public policy).
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blindness to any journalistic motive other than the public good. 167 This
tunnel vision could prove helpful in cases such as Cohen, where editors
flagrantly violated journalistic ethics to obtain a better story, or in situa-
tions where reporting or editing mistakes result in an inadvertent identifi-
cation of a confidential source. Indeed, had Cohen been tried under
breach of confidence, the fact that Dan Cohen leaked his information
only days before the statewide elections may have been sufficient to prove
that public interest in the elections warranted the newspaper's identifica-
tion of Cohen. The broad protection that the public interest defense af-
fords the news media, therefore, would justify the adoption by United
States courts of the breach of confidence theory.
III
Conclusion
The use of confidential sources by journalists has grown phenome-
nally in the past two decades. This growth is due both to the increasing
popularity of investigative reporting and to journalistic laziness. The in-
creasing use of confidential sources also has changed the way journalists
treat these sources. At one time, journalists' efforts focused on protect-
ing their sources' identities in the face of court-ordered inquiries. Today,
journalists are fighting for the legal right to voluntarily identify sources
who were pledged confidentiality in exchange for information. One court
has properly found that the act of voluntary identification constitutes a
breach of contract and, therefore, is unprotected by the first amend-
ment's limiting newsgathering privilege. The decision was a welcome in-
dicator that courts will police journalists who refuse to police themselves.
Yet, journalists correctly have criticized the decision because it failed to
consider the importance of the news story that resulted from the breach
of confidentiality.
Contract law serves as an excellent vehicle for enforcing journalists'
promises of confidentiality. Yet, neither contract law nor the first
amendment's newsgathering privilege always enable the courts to con-
sider a story's ultimate importance to the public. This particularly holds
true when civil laws are breached in the course of gathering news for that
story. Only the British cause of action for breach of confidence considers
a news story's value through the assertion of the public interest defense.
Unlike its American counterparts in a breach of contract action, a British
167. See Hubbard, [1972] 2 Q.B. at 95-96 (Denning M.R., L.) (public interest examines
danger to the public posed by confidential material); see also G. ROBERTSON & A. NICOL,
supra note 58, at 117 (public importance of confidential information determines if it falls
within public interest); Hammond, supra note 157, at 117 (public interest determination fo-
cuses on interest of "world at large").
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 12:565
1990] REPORTER-SOURCE CONFIDENTIALITY 591
court in a breach of confidence case must nimbly balance the source's
need for confidentiality against the necessity for more fully informing the
public.
Availability of this cause of action forces journalists to use more
care in determining when to expose the identities of confidential sources.
The remedy, however, also protects journalists who serve the public in-
terest by exposing the identity of a confidential source. If United States
journalists wish to voluntarily expose sources and compel the courts to
consider the importance of the resulting news story, they should lobby
for adoption of Great Britain's breach of confidence remedy and its pub-
lic interest defense. American adoption of Britain's breach of confidence
remedy and its corresponding public interest defense is in the best inter-
ests of the journalistic profession.

